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Preface 
This paper was written by Thomas Bernauer and Peter Moser as a commissioned study 
in the framework of the Regional Material Balance Approaches to Long-Term Environmental 
1 Policy Planning project (IND project). The policy part of this project - the Rhinemlack 
Triangle Policy Comparison - aims at a better understanding of policy options for cleaning up 
2 
the Black Triangle, particularly with regard to pollution by heavy metals. 
The paper examines the contribution of transboundary political and legal efforts to 
reducing pollution of the river Rhine by heavy metals. In doing so, it seeks to contribute to 
the analysis of the performance of transboundary environmental cooperation, and to gain 
insights that may be relevant to environmental clean-up efforts in the Black-Triangle region. 
The first part of the paper reviews international and transnational agreements aimed at 
reducing Rhine pollution by heavy metals. The second part discusses the evolution of Rhine 
pollution by heavy metals. The third part analyzes the relationship between the evolution of 
cooperation and pollution. It does so by examining: (a) processes by which cooperation may 
affect the behavior of actors polluting the river; (b) actors and institutions that may have 
influenced such processes; and (c) background variables which need to be controlled when 
assessing the impact of transboundary efforts on river pollution. 
I Thonlas Bert~auer is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology (ETH) in Ziirich. Peter Moser is a Ph.D. candidate and Research Associate in the Political Science 
Department of the University of Zurich. Contact address: Thomas Bernauer, Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology (ETH), Center for International Relations, Wiesenstrasse 9, CH-8008 Zurich, Switzerland, Tel: 41- 
(-38 1-094 I, Fax: 41-1-382-0285, Email: bernauer@pw.unizh.ch. 
2 See Blazejczak 1995. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely believed that the river Rhine is one of the most successful examples of 
international cooperation in environmental protection and the management of international 
3 
rivers in particular. One the one hand, pollution of the Rhine has decreased dramatically 
since the beginning of the 1970s. On the other hand, we can observe a growing web of 
transboundary agreements providing for just that - a cleaner Rhine. This correlation of 
reduced pollution and growing international cooperation provides good ground for the 
assumption that there is a connection between the two phenomena. Indeed, analysts often take 
it for granted that the necessity of international cooperation to resolve transboundary pollution 
problems implies the effectiveness of cooperation when it occurs - particularly if the stated 
goals of the actors involved are met, as it is the case with the Rhine. However, the 
connections between presumed causes (international cooperation) and effects (reduced 
pollution) are usually not as straightforward as one might think. They may be mediated by 
many other variables, or presumed correlations can be entirely spurious, meaning that they are 
caused by other variables and do not reflect a causal relationship between cooperation and 
pollution reductions. 
In this paper we try to disentangle the Rhine story, with the goal of isolating and 
bringing into perspective the role that various forms of transboundary cooperation have 
played in reducing pollution of the river. In line with the broader research project, within 
which this paper is situated, we focus on heavy metals. The aim of the paper is to contribute 
to the analysis of the performance of transboundary environmental cooperation, and to gain 
insights that may be relevant to environmental clean-up efforts in the 'Black triangle' region. 
The first part of the paper reviews international and transnational agreements aimed at 
reducing Rhine pollution by heavy metals. The second part discusses the evolution of Rhine 
pollution by heavy metals. The third part analyzes the relationship between the evolution of 
cooperation and pollution. It does so by examining: (a) processes by which cooperation may 
affect the behavior of actors polluting the river; (b) actors and institutions that may have 
influenced such processes; and (c) background variables which need to be controlled when 
assessing the impact of transboundary cooperation on river pollution. 
2. Transboundary Cooperation 
Each of the existing transboundary agreements regulating Rhine pollution may, at least 
hypothetically, have had an effect on the discharge of heavy metals into the Rhine or its 
tributaries. Hence they are described here as a starting point. These agreements can be divided 
into three categories: 
International agreements aimed exclusively at reducing pollution of the Rhine. 
The parties to these agreements include all riparian states of the Rhine, or the 
Rhine basin, including Switzerland. The European Union is also a party to these 
agreements. 
Transnational accords under private law between firms discharging heavy metals 
into the Rhine and those suffering damage from this pollution. 
Environmental regulations by the European Union (EU, formerly the European 
4 Community). These regulations are applicable to EU member states and thus also 
to the riparian countries of the Rhine, with the exception of Switzerland 
3 See Stigliani et al. 1993:786; Neue Ziircher Zeitung, 17.3.90. For more critical views, see LeMarquand 
1977:123, who attributes progress in cleaning up the Rhine more to domestic political pressure than to 
international cooperation. 
4 For reasons of simplicity, we use the term European Union throughout the paper. 
2.1 International Efforts Focused Exclusively on the Rhine 
The International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution 
Early traces of what today is called international environmental law can be found in 
5 
some of the older treaties relating to the river Rhine. However, 1950 is usually considered as 
the starting point of the modern history of international environmental cooperation among the 
riparians of the Rhine (Kiss 1985:621). At that time, a coordinating body, the International 
Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution (ICPR), was set up by an 
6 
exchange of notes, following several initiatives by the Netherlands (Goppel 1991:4). The 
Netherlands had since the early 1920s expressed its concern over pollution of the Rhine by 
the upstream countries (Goppel 1991:4, ICPR 1994). The reason for the Dutch interest in a 
cleaner Rhine is straightforward. The Netherlands draws a large share of its freshwater supply 
from the Rhine. At the same time, it is located at the mouth of the river and is thus unable to 
influence directly the quality of water flowing into the country from outside its jurisdiction. 
The ICPR was reconstituted in 1963 by a formal treaty among the riparian states: 
Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (the 
latter is connected to the Rhine basin through the river Moselle). The functions of the ICPR 
were quite narrowly defined. Its tasks are to: 
monitor the nature, the extent, and the sources of pollution; 
propose measures for the protection of the Rhine; and 
prepare agreements among the parties. 
The functions of the secretariat of the ICPR (located in Koblenz, Germany) are those of 
an advisory body that has no decision making power of its own. Decisions by the ICPR must 
be taken by consensus, which tends to produce agreements at the lowest common 
denominator. Indeed, the ICPR and its secretariat did not play a very active role during the 
1960s and early 1970s and were unable to exert political pressure on the riparian governments 
to cut their pollution of the river (LeMarquand 1977). The ICPR concentrated merely on the 
first of its three functions during the first ten years of its existence: gathering and publishing 
7 information on the pollution of the Rhine. 
The Annual Rhine Environmental Ministers Conference 
Some progress was made in 1972, when on the initiative of the Netherlands the first 
Annual Rhine Environmental Ministers meeting was instituted. Although these meetings were 
subsequently not held every year as planned, they have been the most important international 
forum for the discussion and resolution of Rhine water quality issues at a high political level 
(LeMarquand 1976: 112). It seems that this step exerted a reviving influence on the ICPR by 
giving it clearly defined objectives. Already in the following year, the Rhine Ministers 
meeting directed the ICPR to negotiate a Convention regulating chemical pollution of the 
Rhine. 
France was among the major advocates of a convention on chemical pollution despite 
its not being very much affected by this form of pollution. The motives for the French 
position may have been the low costs that cuts in chemical pollution would entail for French 
See, for instance, the "Convention relative to the carriage of inflammable substances on the Rhine," 
concluded in 1902. 
6 A Treaty, concluded in 1885 and regulating salmon fishery along the Rhine, provided for occasional 
meetings of government representatives. It served as a framework for the meetings in which Rhine pollution 
was first discussed at the end of the 1940s. These meetings ultimately led to the decision to establish a special 
commission that would exclusively deal with Rhine pollution (Romy 1990:52). 
' The monitoring program of the ICPR was gradually expanded over the years. A continuous 
measurement program at all Rhine monitoring stations (as compared to only 26 samples before) is in place since 
1980 (IKSR, Tatigkeitsbericht 1980). 
industry, and the desire to shift the political pressure for environmental protection by France 
on to other actors. Since the 1930s, France had been accused of being the biggest chloride 
polluter of the Rhine (Bernauer 1995a). Germany, by contrast, would bear the heaviest burden 
if chemical pollution were to be cut, because it had the largest industries along the Rhine. 
Convention for the Protection of the Rhine against Chemical Pollution 
These renewed efforts produced first results in 1976. Two treaties were signed: 
the Convention for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution by Chlorides; 
and, more important for this paper, 
. the Convention for the Protection of the Rhine against Chemical Pollution, the so 
called Bonn Convention 
The coming into existence of the Bonn Convention was fraught with difficulties (ICPR 
1975-76). The signing of the accord was retarded by one year because, due to problems 
unrelated to the agreement, there was no ministerial conference in 1975 (ICPR 1975-76). The 
treaty finally entered into force in 1979. This delay resulted from concerns in the German 
Federal Republic that the costs, which would fall heavily on German industry, would be too 
high. 
The approach used in the Bonn Convention is heavily influenced by the European 
Community's directive on "Pollution Caused by Certain Dangerous Substances Discharged 
into the Aquatic Environment" (761464lEEC) (Romy 199054). The influence of the EC was 
recognized by admitting the latter as a full member to the ICPR and inviting it to join the 
8 Bonn Convention. Like the EC directive, the Bonn Convention is a framework agreement. It 
outlines the general aims of the environmental protection effort, that of reducing pollution of 
the Rhine. It defines black and grey (called Annex I and Annex 11) lists of substances which 
are to be controlled through different procedures (see GrjinsIMostert 1992). It directs the 
ICPR to elaborate proposals for threshold values for particular substances and branches of 
industry. Only in a second stage would these proposals become binding rules (once they are 
adopted unanimously by the contracting parties); that is, national emission permits could not 
exceed the agreed thresholds. The Bonn Convention expanded the geographical scope of 
cooperation by providing for the application of the agreement to the entire Rhine basin. The 
1963 treaty establishing the ICPR was applicable only to the Rhine itself. In other words, the 
Bonn Convention applies to discharges into the Rhine itself plus discharges into its 
tributaries. 
The Rhine Action Program (RAP) 
Since 1987, the Rhine Action Program (RAP) has emerged as the leading international 
effort to protect the Rhine against pollution. There are two immediate reasons for this 
development: (a) difficulties with the implementation of the Bonn Convention (see below); 
and (b) the accident in November 1986 at the Swiss chemical firm Sandoz, which had 
catastrophic consequences for the ecology of the river and disrupted water-supply systems 
downstream. At the Rhine Environmental Ministers Conference of October 1987 (the third 
within a year, since the accident) the Rhine Action Programme prepared by the ICPR was 
adopted. In contrast to the Bonn Convention, the RAP is not a formal treaty but a gentlemen's 
agreement. It covers a broader range of Rhine environmental issues and its approach is 
different, one might say more pragmatic. 
The overarching goal, symbolizing the health of the ecosystem as a whole, is the re- 
introduction of the Salmon in the river and its tributaries by the year 2000. As a result of the 
Sandoz spill, the prevention and reduction of pollution caused by accidents has gained in 
8 A representative of the EU Commission usually takes part in the Annual Rhine Ministers Conference. 
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importance. Another critical area of activity is the reduction of chemical pollution, which is to 
be attained this time by means different from those of the Bonn Convention, namely: 
Specific water quality targets: taking as a baseline the year 1985, a 50% reduction 
of the total load of priority substances (among which are heavy metals) over the 
entire course of the river should be reached by 1995; in 199 1 the reduction targets 
for lead and cadmium were increased to 70% (ICPR 1 994).9 
To achieve the reduction targets, the ICPR can make recommendations as to the 
waste-water treatment technology which should be used in specific industries. 
Such recommendations have been issued for the cellulose industry (1992), 
communal waste water management (1 99 I), treatment of metallic surfaces ( 1992, 
with possible implications for heavy metals), the production of paper and 
cardboard (1993), and the organic chemistry industry. The member states of the 
ICPR are under the obligation to ensure the application of "best available 
technology" on their territory, and to report to the ICPR about their activities (see 
ICPR reports). Because the ICPR's recommendations are not legally binding, their 
monitoring and enforcement is based on informal control which operates largely 
at the domestic level (ICPR 1992:30). 
The RAP encompasses not only the reduction of pollution originating from point 
sources but also diffuse sources. It remains to be seen, however, whether the RAP 
will be able to contribute to the reduction of pollution by diffuse sources 
(GrjinsIMostert 1992:35). The press communiquk of the eleventh Rhine Ministers 
Conference (December 1994) states that the specified targets for pollution from 
diffuse sources were not yet met, and that diffuse pollution originating from 
agriculture remains a serious problem. 
To achieve the RAP'S goals, the Rhine riparians agreed to a three-stage process: 
The first stage was to consist primarily of fact-finding, particularly the 
establishment of detailed national registers of important dischargers, and the 
development of models to estimate the costs and benefits of measures to be taken. 
During the second stage, from 1989 to 1995, the proposals made by the ICPR 
were to be put into effect. 
In the third stage (1995-2000), the remaining problems were to be ironed out. 
The eleventh Rhine ministers conference stated that for mercury, cadmium, lead, 
copper, and zinc further measures were necessary to achieve the 70% reduction target set in 
1991. It also requested that the ICPR elaborate a new international convention for the pro- 
tection of the Rhine. Entering into force by the year 2000, this agreement would go beyond 
pollution matters and address a wider range of ecological problems, such as the reconstitution 
of natural habitats and flood protection measures. 
2.2 Transnational Cooperation 
A relatively new and innovative transboundary measure aimed at reducing pollution of 
the Rhine involves non-state actors, such as firms or municipalities. The most widely 
publicised such case relating to Rhine pollution by heavy metals involves the city of 
Rotterdam one the one hand and chemical industries in Germany, Switzerland, and France on 
the other hand. 
The City of Rotterdam is under the obligation, imposed by public law, to keep its 
harbour navigable. It therefore has to remove sediments from the harbour, which lies at the 
9 For a detailed list of the threshold values, see ICPR Tatigkeitsbericht 1991:140. There is a clause in the 
program which allows for exceptions from the 50% rule for pollutants which were heavily reduced in the years 
before 1987 and whose emission is already subject to Best Available Technology. 
mouth of the Rhine. These sediments have, over time, become more and more contaminated 
(particularly by heavy metals) as a result of Rhine pollution. Dutch law as well as 
international law prohibit the dumping of these sediments into the North Sea. Nor can they be 
used for land-fills, but have to be disposed of in special repositories on the Dutch coast, so- 
called slufters. Such a slufter was built in the mid-1980s at a cost of around 200 million 
Dutch Guilders, of which the Municipality of Rotterdam had to contribute about half. This 
slufter will be full approximately by the year 2000. If the construction of another, costly, 
slufter is to be avoided, heavy metal loads in the Rhine will have to be reduced substantially 
(70-90%). The Municipality of Rotterdam therefore started a highly publicised project to: 
identify the principal dischargers of heavy metals along the Rhine (for example by 
sending a vessel on reconnaissance missions upstream); and 
conclude agreements with polluters 
To enhance its bargaining position, which as a sub-national actor downstream would 
otherwise have been weak, Rotterdam threatened lawsuits against upstream polluters. In 
return for pollution reductions by upstream polluters, Rotterdam offered to drop its liability 
claims for the costs it incurred as a result of the contaminated harbour sediments. The most 
important legal premise backing the credibility of the threat is the fact that Rotterdam could 
10 file a lawsuit before the courts of any state bordering the Rhine. This means that a Dutch 
court, which would apply potentially more favourable Dutch environmental law and would 
presumably be more sympathetic to Dutch victims, could decide in the matter. (For a detailed 
discussion of the legal issues involved in the Rotterdam cases, see van Dunne 1990, 1992, and 
Kernkamps 1992.) 
After extensive research, the Rotterdam authorities began to negotiate with 2 Swiss, 4 
11 French and 7 German companies. These negotiations have so far resulted in several 
agreements. The most important agreement was concluded with the Association of the 
German chemical industry (VCI) in mid-1991. 100 out of VCIs' 400 members discharge 
pollutants into the Rhine. Other contracts were concluded with Sandoz, the Duisburger 
Kupferhiitte and Rh6ne-Poulenc. Yet other negotiations seem to be under way. 
Characteristically these contracts contain clauses regarding the time-span during which 
certain immissions are to be reduced, and by what degree this should be done. They also 
contain provisions regarding the periodic evaluation of the fulfilment of the terms of the 
contract. In the case of a breach of the contract, the claim for tort by the Municipality of 
Rotterdam will be revived. (For further information about the legal contents of these 
contracts, see van Dunn6 (1992: 124). 
2.3 Environmental Regulations of the European Union 
Even though the protection of the natural environment has been an explicit task of the 
12 European Union only since the Single European Act of 1986 , the Union moved into this 
policy area already in 1973. The first Environmental Action Programme (EAP) adopted in 
13 that year and also the subsequent EAPs mention water quality as a concern. These EAPs 
have served as guidelines for EU policy and have not had a legally binding character. On a 
somewhat more specific level the EU has issued a number of directives which either define 
10 This possibility originates in a decision by the European Court of Justice in connection with a key-case 
in transboundary environmental liability: the case of Dutch nursery firms against the Mines de Potasse d'Alsace 
(MdPA) over MdPA's discharges of chloride into the Rhine (Bernauer 1995a). 
I I The companies chosen were those whose discharges of certain pollutants exceeded one percent of their 
total annual load at Lobith in the reference year 1985 (van DunnC 1992, 122). 
12 See Art 130r.s. 
I3 See the Preamble and Article 2 of the EC-treaty of 1957, which state that one of the aims of the EC is 
to ameliorate living conditions and to further a harmonious development of the EC's economies. 
quality objectives for certain types of water consumption or emission norms for the discharge 
of certain substances. 
Water quality directives 
This category of EU legislative activity includes most notably: 
the directive on the quality of surface water for the production of drinking water 
(75/440EEC), adopted in 1975; 
the directive on the quality of freshwater capable of supporting fish life 
(78/659/EEC), adopted in 1978; 
and the drinking water directive (80/778EEC), adopted in 1980. 
These three directives do not prescribe a general minimum quality standard for all 
surface waters. They even leave it up to the member states to define the waters to which the 
directives should apply (GrjinsMostert 1992: 29). Moreover, there has been considerable 
14 disagreement about the effectiveness of these directives. 
Emission directives 
Potentially more important to our study are the EU's emission directives, not least 
because they seem to have influenced the content of some of the treaties concluded among the 
riparian states of the Rhine (see above). The most important piece of legislation relating to 
emission standards is 
the 1976 directive "on Pollution Caused by Certain Dangerous Substances 
Discharged into the Aquatic Environment" (761464EEC). 
This directive established a framework for issuing more specific directives that contain 
thresholds for concentrations of certain harmful substances in the waste water of specific 
branches of industry. It distinguishes between substances on a "black" and a "grey" list. Black 
list substances are considered especially harmful and their discharge must therefore be 
completely halted in due course. As to the grey list, member states are free in how they wish 
to address emissions of such substances. According to a 1983 decision of the European 
Council, heavy metals are among those black list substances that are to be dealt with in 
priority. Analysts have observed, however, that the implementation of this directive has been 
unsatisfactory (GrjinsMostert 1992: 26). Follow-up directives established thresholds for a 
small number of substances only, most notably: 
mercury in waste water of the chlor-alkali electrolysis industry (821176EEC) and 
other branches of industry (841 156EEC) (adopted in 1982 and 1984 respectively); 
and 
cadmium (831513EEC) (adopted in 1983). 
3. The Evolution of Rhine Pollution 
After having outlined the web of transnational agreements and activity aimed at curbing 
pollution of the Rhine, we now turn to the environmental outcome, to which these agreements 
and activities relate. Until the end of the 1960s pollution of the Rhine increased steadily - 
with peak loads of heavy metals in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Stigliani et. al. 1993:790). 
Since then, pollution has declined significantly. The pattern of this decrease is essentially 
similar for all heavy metals: we can observe a very steep decrease from the peak years until 
about the mid-1980; since then the decline has slowed down with concentrations stagnating at 
a relatively low level (IKSR 1994; van Dunn6 1992: 117). Figure 1 shows, as an example, the 
pollution by cadmium. 
14 Kramer (1992: 11) argues that the implementation of agreed measures has been extremely difficult, 
agreed programs were rarely elaborated further, and actual reduction measures were only occasionally carried 
out. 
Average annual Cadmium loads in the Rhine at 
Bimmen-Lobith 1975-1 991 
1 entry into force of the Bonn Convention (1979) 
2 entry into force of the Cadmium directive (8315 13IEEC) (1983) 
3 entry into force of the Cadmium threshold values prepared in the framework of the Bonn 
Convention (1 986) 
Source: Bundesministerium fiir Urnwelt Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit 1995: Abb. 5a. 
Most international efforts to reduce pollution of the Rhine have concentrated on point 
sources. At the same time, pollution by point sources has declined significantly more than 
pollution by diffuse sources as the annexed chart (source: Stigliani et al. (1993: 790) shows. 
To conclude from this correlation that international cooperation must have influenced 
pollution would be premature. This correlation may rather stem from the fact that it is much 
easier to reduce pollution from relatively few and clearly identifiable point sources than from 
numberless diffuse sources; consequently, international efforts and efforts at the polluter level 
have tended to concentrate on point sources. 
In looking closer at pollution originating from point sources, it is interesting to note that 
the iron, steellcoke, and metal refining industries, which in their peak years were major point 
sources for all three pollutants examined in the chart, had reduced their emissions 
dramatically by 1988. For instance, aqueous cadmium emissions discharged by the metal 
refining industries had amounted to almost 40% of the total cadmium load of the Rhine in the 
peak year. By 1988, they were reduced to zero. Stigliani et. al. (1993), see Figure 2 in Annex, 
attribute this progress to: 
The installation of waste-water treatment as a result of more stringent national re- 
gulation. 
Implementation of good housekeeping practices: by-products of production 
processes (such as cadmium in Zinc refineries), which used to be dumped into the 
Rhine, are now considered as valued resources. 
Metal-producing industries recycle their waste and have replaced older, more 
wasteful technologies by cleaner processes. 
Other factors, which may have contributed to pollution reductions, include industrial 
restructuring processes in the Rhine area, particularly in the context of declining coal and 
steel production. Whether, and if so how and to what degree, transboundary cooperation has 
influenced these developments will be examined in the next section. 
4. Hypotheses and Methodology 
The previous two sections of the paper have examined transboundary efforts to curb 
pollution of the Rhine (the potential explanatory variables) and the evolution of Rhine 
pollution (the dependent variables). Now we turn to the issue of whether there is a causal 
relationship between the two groups of variables. Drawing on a broader range of social 
15 
science theories , we first outline a number of effects that transboundary cooperation may, 
hypothetically, have on the behavior of polluters along the Rhine. The second part discusses 
some methodological issues involved in the analysis of the effects of transboundary 
cooperation. The third part presents the results of our research. 
4.1 Hypothetical Effects 
In the simplest case, a specific transboundary regulation will either be directly 
applicable at the domestic level, or will be transformed into national law. To avoid the 
consequences of breaching the law, polluters will react to new regulations by changing their 
behavior, for exam le b installing waste water treatment facilities or using cleaner pro- 
?6 ' duction technology. In the case of agreements that are not legally binding, such as the RAP, 
the cause-effect relationship could work in a similar way. The recommendations by the ICPR 
serve as guidelines for national regulations which influence the behavior of the relevant 
polluters. In both cases one should expect that Rhine pollution decreases after the conclusion 
of transboundary agreements. If, at the same time, we can make a plausible (counterfactual) 
argument that polluters would not have reduced their emissions in the absence of 
transboundary efforts, we can claim that international efforts had an effect on Rhine pollution. 
In addition to direct effects, such as those just discussed, transboundary cooperation 
may have several more indirect effects. The prospect of future regulation may throw its 
shadow on the present behavior of polluters. If, for instance, the expected conclusion of an 
international agreement makes stricter regulation probable in the future, a polluter might 
change its behavior in advance in order to spread her investment in pollution reduction over a 
longer time span and gain a competitive advantage. The same effect may occur if the shadow 
stems not from new national and international legislation, but from the threat of costly 
lawsuits against polluters. In addition, as more and more companies believe that stricter 
regulations will be adopted, greater competition for a "greener" image may set in. In all these 
cases, we should expect pollution reductions even before the conclusion of transboundary 
agreements. 
The question of time-lags underlines that the direction of causal relationships is crucial 
to the analysis because it provides preliminary answers as to whether transboundary 
cooperation has had an effect on pollution reduction. It will be noted that causal relationships 
between transboundary and national and actor-specific pollution reduction efforts can also 
work the other way around: national or actor-specific efforts can determine cooperation at the 
transboundary level in that states only agree to reduction measures that have already been 
agreed to or implemented at the domestic level. In this case, no new obligations exceeding 
domestic standards are created at the transboundary level and, therefore, transboundary efforts 
have not affected domestic efforts. The same holds for lawsuits. In the Rotterdam case, for 
example, some analysts have claimed that upstream chemical firms signed on to reduction 
targets that they knew they were going to implement irrespective of the Rotterdam case. Even 
15 For a theoretical and conceptual analysis of the issues involved in analyzing the effects of international 
environmental institutions, see Bernauer 1995b. 
16 Social science theories offer various explanations of why individuals or groups behave in compliance 
with norms or rules. For example, actors may comply because they fear costly punishment (sanctions). They 
may also comply out of a habit of obedience (see Bernauer 1995b). 
in such cases, however, we may find that transboundary efforts can have other types of effects 
on the behavior of polluters at the domestic level, including the following. 
First, transboundary cooperation may lead to changes in domestic power structures. For 
example, governments or, at a lower level, environmental agencies which run into 
implementation problems with domestic regulations on water pollution may use 
transboundary obligations to increase their pressure on polluters and the interests supporting 
them. This strategy may facilitate the implementation of agreed or planned domestic 
measures. 
Second, the additional information generated by transboundary cooperation can foster 
pollution reductions in at least three ways. It can render riparian actors more willing to engage 
in cooperation on pollution reductions because it raises transparency. Incomplete information 
on the present and future preferences and behavior of the actors in a given group is widely 
regarded as one of the major impediments to cooperation. This applies in particular to cases 
where pollution reductions by one actor are contingent on reductions by another actor (see 
Morrow 1994). Information generated by transboundary efforts can be used by environmental 
lobby groups, waterworks, or political authorities to exert pressure on national governments, 
individual firms or other actors (shame these actors into pollution reductions). Finally, 
information generated through transboundary cooperation can result in new options for 
reducing pollution at lower cost, which in turn increases the willingness of polluters to 
comply with more stringent regulations. 
4.2 Methodology 
The analysis of whether transboundary efforts have contributed to the reduction of 
heavy metal pollution of the Rhine, and if so, to what extent, does not lend itself to the appli- 
cation of statistical methods. We therefore chose a qualitative approach. This step requires 
some justification because evaluation research into domestic environmental policies is often 
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carried out with quantitative methods. 
The potential causal connections between international cooperation on the one hand and 
pollution reductions on the other hand are much more drawn-out and multifaceted than on a 
regional or geographically even more restricted (e.g. communal) level, where the direct effect 
of the entering into force of a new national or communal regulation may be a quite distinct 
event, triggering a behavioral change on the part of polluters. Even the preliminary and 
superficial comparison of important events, such as the entering into force of a treaty or a 
follow-up regulation, and the development of pollution over time (see section 3) shows that 
immediately obvious connections between any of them are lacking. Thus one of the 
conditions which would make the application of a statistical method, such as impact analysis 
with a Box-Tiao time series model, sensible, is not given. There are no significant breaks in 
the pollution data time-series which could be assigned to specific events and tested as to their 
non-randomness and which, in turn, would allow us to hypothesize about a causal 
18 
connection. Even if the pollution data were abundant enough to allow for the application of 
statistical methods, there would be yet another problem: the variables which influence 
pollution in such a wide area as the Rhine catchment area are very numerous. Consequently, 
exogenous variables are extremely difficult to control. This implies that spurious correlations 
between transboundary cooperation and pollution reductions might not be recognized. 
See, for, example, Thomas Widmer, Evaluation von Massnahmen zur Luftreinhaltepolitik in der 
Schweiz (Evaluation of clean-air policy in Switzerland) (Chur and Zurich: Verlag Ruegger, 1991). 
18 This may well be the case with a pollution reduction measure at the domestic or even local level: there 
the behavioral change may stem mainly from the entering into force of a particular law, or, more precisely, from 
the change in  conditions brought about for the relevant actors. In such cases, therefore, statistical methods for 
analyzing the impact of events on time series data (Box-Tiao) may be more appropriate. 
Finally, from a policy perspective, the advantage of a qualitative approach is that it 
allows us to trace in detail the causal chains that connect transboundary cooperation with 
polluter behavior. Hence the results are more likely to yield practical knowledge on when 
which type of effort affects polluters in which manner, or, conversely, when and why 
transboundary efforts fail. 
The following analysis is based on a critical synthesis of the very sparse secondary 
literature relevant to the area of our study and, more important, interviews with a selected 
group of experts, including Dr. Schulte-Wulwer-Leidig (Secretariat of the ICPR, Koblenz, 
Germany), Dr. Michael von Berg (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Bonn, Germany), 
Prof. J. Wessel (Delft Technical University, Delft, Netherlands), Mr. Mark Uilhoorn 
(Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Netherlands), Mr. Karel Dieperink (University of Utrecht, 
Utrecht, Netherlands), Dr. Walter Julich (IAWR, Amsterdam, Netherlands), and Mr. Edwin 
Muller (Department for the Environment, Bern, Switzerland). In compliance with a request 
made by most of our interview partners, we do not attribute particular pieces of information to 
individuals. 
5. The Effects of Transboundary Cooperation 
This section presents the results of our analysis in three steps. First, it examines the 
causal pathways by which transboundary cooperation has affected the perceptions and 
ultimately the behavior of the actors relevant to the cleanup of the Rhine. Second, it 
complements the preceding, process-oriented analysis by looking at the actors involved in 
efforts to curb Rhine pollution. Third, we identify a number of background conditions present 
in the Rhine case, which have influenced the decline of pollution in general. This last step is 
necessary if we wish to draw any lessons from the Rhine case that might, for instance, be 
applicable to the Black-Triangle region. 
In our research, we found that transboundary efforts contributed to the cleanup of the 
Rhine by: 
increasing information about the pollution of the river and the technical and 
political means to deal with the problem; and by 
strengthening government agencies involved in the implementation of environ- 
mental legislation in their national context against the rest of the government 
structure and the polluting firms. 
To a lesser extent, transboundary efforts may also have fostered pollution reductions 
by: 
being anticipated in their effects by polluters; and 
initiating the implementation of internationally agreed and directly applicable 
environmental legislation. 
5.1 Information 
In the Rhine case, a very important, if not the most important effect of transboundary 
cooperation was that institutionalized exchanges of information among national government 
agencies involved in implementing environmental standards enhanced their problem-solving 
capacity by increasing their knowledge. The Rhine regime, defined as the totality of the 
international agreements and organizations, thus acted as a learning facilitator. At present, the 
governmental authorities responsible for the implementation of environmental legislation in 
the riparian states form a close-knit community. This community shares a coherent view 
regarding not only the extent and origins of Rhine pollution, but also about the available 
technological means to deal with problems as they occur. 
This community did not spring into life immediately; its evolution was on the contrary 
a lengthy process. It began in the mid-1950s, when the first annual pollution data, covering 
only a few parameters, were published by the ICPR. These data were collected by national 
measurement stations. During the 1960s, information exchanges were restricted to annual 
pollution figures collected at the principal national measurement stations along the Rhine. 
This approach may have raised the general awareness of Rhine pollution problems. But it 
does not seem to have significantly influenced the behavior of national water agencies, which 
at that time were weak. It should be noted that during this early period the ICPR was not do- 
minated, as it is today, by technocrats but largely by diplomats. Contacts intensified after the 
first 1973 meeting of the Rhine riparians' environmental ministers, which asked the ICPR to 
negotiate a convention on chemical pollution. 
The 1976 chemical convention added an important layer of institutionalized information 
flows. This development led to the further enhancement and unification of measurement pro- 
19 grams. It also institutionalized international discussions about threshold values for 
particular polluting substances. Therefore, even though the results of this development in 
terms of legally binding agreements were rather poor, these information exchanges facilitated 
discussions on sensible threshold values for polluting substances and the technical 
possibilities of dealing with the problems at hand. In the framework of the 1986 Rhine Action 
Programme, the riparian states must supply information on the pollution of the Rhine, 
including data on individual firms and their emissions. They must also indicate for individual 
substances the reductions which are possible applying the best available technology (BAT). 
Beforehand, such detailed information was not available to many of the national authorities. 
The requirement to furnish this information to the ICPR and the other parties thus made it 
necessary for at least some ri arians to allocate more resources to the collection and 
processing of such information. 28 
This increase in transboundary information flows has resulted in a homogenization of 
perceptions of Rhine pollution problems, and, perhaps equally important, common views 
about the available technical means to solve these problems. The various treaty provisions 
concerning information gathering and exchange thus had the important effect of binding 
together national authorities directly involved in Rhine pollution issues. They helped to create 
a closely connected community of low- to mid-level government officials and scientists. This 
group has met largely in the working groups of the ICPR to exchange information about new 
forms of pollution, polluters, sudden increases in pollution due to accidents, measurement 
methods, pollution abatement technologies, and so on. As a result, it seems that new 
information and knowledge has spread virtually as quickly across as within national 
boundaries. Moreover, this development appears to have strengthened national government 
agencies dealing with Rhine pollution vis-2-vis coalitions representing the interests of 
polluting actors, for example, industry associations, or industry and transportation ministries. 
Information networks, such as the one just discussed, have also developed at the non- 
governmental level. The water purification plants in the Rhine catchment area are under the 
obligation to secure certain water quality standards. Not surprisingly, therefore, they have 
been very much interested in the quality of the Rhine water they use and measure the latter 
regularly. This information is cleared through a non-governmental organization, the 
2 1 International Association of Waterworks in the Rhine Basin (IAWR). It serves to identify 
19 Bonn Convention, Art. 8- 13. 
20 The fact alone that these measurements (and the improvement of measurement programs in general) 
have existed seems to have affected the behavior or polluters in a favorable manner. As they could no longer 
assume that the origin of a particular polluting substance would be unknown to the authorities, they had a strong 
incentive to curb their immissions. 
2 1 Due to the larger number of measurement stations, the information produced by this non- 
governmental network is geographically more fine-grained than the information coming from the official 
measurement stations; it thus seems to allow a quite exact identification of polluters. 
polluters and exert pressure on them as well as national legislators or, as it seems to be in- 
creasingly the case, the European Commission in Brussels. 
5.2 Strengthening of Environmental Government Agencies 
As shown above, there exists plausible evidence that the Rhine regime has strengthened 
environmental agencies by facilitating the transboundary flow of information. International 
obligations concerning national measurement programs and requirements (for example in the 
RAP) seem in some cases to have been instrumental in mobilizing additional resources for the 
reporting agencies. In addition, the regime seems to have acted as an "agent of internal 
realignments" (Levy/Young/Osherenko 1991) in other ways as well. Environmental agencies 
have been able to use international commitments made by their governments as arguments in 
support of their (often costly) goals vis-it-vis other branches of the bureaucracy in intra-go- 
vernmental bargaining processes about resources and policy goals and probably also the 
polluters themselves. 
One of the most interesting examples of an environmental agency which used the 
existence of an international commitment to enhance its own standing domestically is the 
"Agence de l'eau Rhin-Meuse," situated in Metz. The French water management authorities 
(agences de l'eau), which are organised by catchment area, are designed to act as financial 
intermediaries between polluters and consumers of water. They subsidize, but cannot initiate, 
water improvement projects through fees levied from polluters. In this particular case, the 
agence de l'eau in Metz seems to have tripled the emission levies in its domain by referring to 
the commitment which the French Government had entered into in the context of the RAP. 
Besides improving water quality, the increased levies also made the agence grow. It seems to 
serve as a model which other French water agencies seem keen to emulate. It is a telling detail 
that the director of the agence de l'eau Rhin-Meuse is now head of department in the 
environmental ministry in Paris. 
5.3 Anticipation of Regulation by Polluters 
So far we have discussed causal chains by which the Rhine regime has influenced 
pollution by changing the perceptions and means available to national authorities. Besides 
these more indirect effects, it appears that transboundary efforts have exerted more direct 
positive effects on the behavior of polluting industries. In particular the establishment of new 
programs for measuring pollution of the Rhine, the commitment to pollution thresholds in the 
chemical convention, and the ensuing discussions about them in the 1970s and 1980s have 
cast a shadow ahead. These developments were interpreted by those actors potentially 
affected as a sign of further tightening of environmental regulation in the future. Hence these 
actors reacted by reducing their pollution in advance of anticipated legally binding laws by 
installing waste treatment plants or transferring especially polluting activities out of the Rhine 
catchment area. The same logic applies to the mandatory national registers of important 
polluters and discussions about international BAT standards after the adoption of the RAP. 
The intense interest with which the big chemical firms located along the Rhine have observed 
developments in the framework of the ICPR makes this claim at least plausible. It would also 
account for the fact that heavy metal loads in the Rhine started to decrease before 
international agreements entered into effect. 
It is, however, difficult to isolate the exact role of the Rhine regime in this respect. 
Even if one concedes that polluters anticipate future legislation (we will discuss this point 
further below), it may be difficult to determine what these polluters actually reacted to: was it 
developments in the ICPR, national measures, measures by the EU, and to what extent does 
each of these potential driving forces account for changes in the behavior of polluters? 
Because the trend towards stricter environmental regulation seems to be a universal and 
largely parallel phenomenon at all levels, it is very difficult to sort out individual effects. An 
additional problem is that the importance of individual factors may vary over time and across 
countries. However, the history of environmental protection efforts by the Rhine riparians 
suggests the following. 
In the 1970s, the focus of attention was mainly national. This applies in particular to 
firms located in countries which initiated comprehensive environmental protection programs 
during this period as a consequence of expanding domestic green movements, especially in 
the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland. This situation has changed somewhat in the 
1980s when tangible discussions about pollution thresholds started in the context of the 
chemical convention, and when the European Community became increasingly involved in 
environmental protection. In recent years notably the European Commission seems to have 
gained in importance. One of the indications is the fact that not only international industrial 
associations but even big national associations, such as the association of German water 
treatment plants, are represented in Brussels. Their aims are to obtain information about the 
substance of future EU directives and also to influence the contents of such directives as far 
as possible. 
5.4 Direct Impacts of Transboundary Measures 
This section evaluates possible direct effects of the two major international agreements 
on Rhine pollution, the 1976 chemical convention with its follow-up agreements on specific 
substances/industries and the 1987 Rhine Action Program. We treat these two agreements 
separately because, as noted above, they are based on different approaches. 
The Chemical Convention 
Most experts agree that the implementation of the Bonn Convention has been 
disappointing, even in a strictly legal sense, let alone the actual effect on pollution loads. The 
22 ICPR prepared 9 recommendations (IKSR 1981, Kiss 628), some of which deal with heavy 
metals. But in the end only two of these proposals were adopted by the riparian countries: 
thresholds for mercury in the waste water of the chlor-alkali electrolysis industry (adopted in 
1982) and, for a slightly wider range of industries, thresholds for cadmium concentrations 
23 (1986) (Goppel 1991). These measures coincide with the European Community's 
implementation directives mentioned above, particularly as regards the substances and 
sources covered by the 1976 directive "on Pollution Caused by Certain Dangerous Substances 
Discharged into the Aquatic Environment" (761464lEEC). This parallel development is due to 
the fact that especially Germany made progress in the Rhine catchment area conditional on 
agreement in the wider context of the EU (see below). 
Another sign for the ineffectiveness of the chemical convention is that by the time the 
follow-up agreements on pollution thresholds for particular industries had entered into force, 
they were to a large extent already obsolete. They had been anticipated by independently 
started programs by national regulatory authorities and possibly the polluters themselves. The 
approach of the chemical convention was obviously not well adapted to the fast-changing cir- 
cumstances prevalent in Rhine environmental matters. Notably, it established a procedure 
much too cumbersome and inflexible to keep pace with the decrease of pollution for reasons 
unrelated to the international effort and the development of new technologies. 
Hence there are enough reasons to argue that the chemical convention did not generate 
any important new obligations, neither for national authorities nor polluters. The legalistic 
make-up of the convention probably reflects an earlier stage of international environmental 
22 According to the ICPR annual reports, the ICPR prepared threshold values for 12 substances, whereas 
only two were adopted. 
23 For details, see ICPR Tatigkeitsbericht 1985 and following. 
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cooperation, at least in Western Europe. In the 1970s when environmental protection was 
just beginning to move up on political agendas, the Rhine riparian governments tried to keep 
the decision-making power on Rhine pollution issues at a political level, so as to keep control 
even about minute technical matters and avoid any costly overcommitment. The greening of 
politics, the parallel growth of environmental authorities (in terms of their resources and 
bureaucratic power) and the ensuing pressure on polluters led to rapid improvements in 
environmental protection technology and cleaner processes: all of this created a new situation 
in which the approach of the chemical convention became virtually useless because its results 
tended to come too late. 
In summary, the ineffectiveness of the Bonn Convention largely stems from its design - 
in particular its cumbersome procedures for negotiating and implementing concrete pollution 
reduction measures - paired with fast developments in pollution reduction at the national 
level, which at that time were easily achievable. Whether the riparian governments would 
have been able in the 1970s and 80s to conclude and implement a more effective approach, 
and which one, remains an open question. In any event, however, Rhine pollution by heavy 
metals and other substances decreased throughout the 1980s, but was driven by forces other 
than the Bonn Convention. International measures in the context of the Bonn Convention 
were, it seems, always several steps behind the evolution of pollution and never really got a 
chance to significantly shape pollution reductions. This ineffectiveness of the convention has 
not escaped the riparian countries. By the end of the 1980s, the ICPR had clearly reduced its 
efforts to implement the agreement. And in 1992 the implementation of the convention seems 
to have been quietly dropped altogether (IKSR 1992).~' 
The Rhine Action Programme 
The evaluation of the RAP is somewhat more complicated than that of the chemical 
convention because in the case of the RAP it becomes more difficult to apply the straight- 
forward top-down model of legislation (international rules are first established and then 
implemented domestically). Negotiations in ICPR working groups between the 
representatives of national environmental authorities and negotiations at the national level 
between polluters and national authorities have proceeded in a parallel and highly interactive 
fashion. This circumstance stems from the fact that environmental authorities in most riparian 
states have in recent years emerged as relatively powerful branches of government. It also 
stems from the less formal/diplomatic and more technical approach to dealing with problems 
in the framework of the ICPR, which has evolved over time (see above). Finally, the lack of 
pressure originating from the need for ratification, which would involve higher political levels 
of government, has also contributed to more flexible and informal forms of cooperation 
between actors at various levels. 
The resulting BAT recommendations therefore have less the character of internatio- 
nally enacted "laws" to be fed subsequently into a national implementation process, but are 
rather some kind of consensual statements of intention of all the parties concerned, including 
the dischargers themselves. The latter are usually few in number for each given industry 
targeted by a particular BAT recommendation. In the paper and cellulose industry, which was 
one of the first to be targeted, only about six dischargers were actually involved. 
It is clearly the case that the RAP was effective in several respects. First, it intensified 
the flow of information. Second, by setting reduction targets within strict time-frames and 
24 It will be noted that at the global level the combination of framework conventions with follow-up 
protocols is still very popular (see, for example, the case of climate change). 
25 In a last-ditch effort, the ICPR decided in 1990 that the formal ratification of its recommendations was 
to be replaced by an accelerated procedure, at least for recommendations that were modelled on EC regulations 
(IKSR Tatigkeitsbericht 1991:3 I): but this does not seem to have resulted in tangible progress. 
elaborating BAT recommendations it created clear points of reference for all the parties. 
Third, the lack of treaty status accelerated agreement on the RAP in the first place, and made 
it possible to get quick results in terms of BAT recommendations. The time gained in 
preparing these soft recommendations probably outweighed the protraction in their 
implementation due to their not legally binding nature. That, according to the CommuniquC of 
the 1 lth Rhine Ministers Conference, the goals set, particularly in the heavy metals domain, 
were not fully reached, has probably much to do with their strictness, and also with the fact, 
that it becomes increasingly difficult and costly to bring about even small additional pollution 
reductions (increasing marginal abatement costs). 
The Rotterdam Agreements 
The agreements between the Rotterdam municipality and various chemical firms along 
the Rhine have been lauded by some analysts - especially and understandably in the legal 
community - as a new and potentially more effective approach to reducing pollution of the 
Rhine than the intergovernmental approach within the framework created by the ICPR. The 
information we obtained through interviews suggests, however, that the effect of the 
Rotterdam effort on Rhine pollution may have been rather small. 
The reduction targets in these agreements did not exceed in a substantial way the 
commitments already pledged to national authorities in the framework of the RAP. The 
argument that the Rotterdam agreements added the extra fear of lawsuits against polluters if 
agreed goals were not met, and therefore changed the polluters' behavior, should be taken 
with a grain of salt. One needs to bear in mind that legal battles of this kind are usually 
extremely costly for both sides while the outcome is by no means clear. Lawsuits in the 
context of chloride pollution of the Rhine have shown that it is extremely difficult to quantify 
pollution damages and attribute this damage to the imrnissions of particular firms. Indeed, 
only in one single case have lawsuits resulted in a clear court verdict and ultimately 
compensation payments (see Bernauer 1995a). This problem reduces the effectiveness of the 
threat of legal action, and therefore also the effect of the threat on the behavior of polluters (if 
we assume that polluters know what we have just said!). This leaves the possibility, however, 
that the behavior-altering fear of the polluters can originate not primarily in the prospective 
damages that might have to be paid to Rotterdam, but rather in the potentially negative effect 
on the image of industries in the case of a highly publicised lawsuit. 
5.5 Actors 
Whereas the analysis has so far focused mainly on processes and the various 
transboundary agreements involved, this section concentrates on actors, including 
governments and environmental authorities, non-governmental organizations such as 
industries and waterworks, the municipality of Rotterdam, and finally the European Union. 
We examine whether, and if so why and how particular actors have been able to influence the 
behavior of polluters, and therefore also the evolution of Rhine pollution by heavy metals. 
Governments and Environmental Authorities 
The analysis of causal pathways has shown that the effects of cooperation cannot be 
explained merely in terms of unitary state actors, that is, governments as entities. If 
cooperation influences polluter behavior, it does so because lower, more technically oriented 
layers of government such as water authorities are able to advance their own interests by 
employing international commitments, such as the Chemical Convention, the RAP, or 
institutions like the ICPR. The involvement of governments as such is neither a sufficient nor 
a necessary condition for the effectiveness of the transboundary efforts we examined. The role 
of governments is rather to create institutions in the first place, and to establish commitments 
as to the goals to be attained. The Rhine environmental ministers' conferences, especially the 
three conferences held after the Sandoz incident, have clearly served this purpose. Whether 
these commitments can trigger a process which leads to changes in the behavior of polluters 
is highly dependent upon other circumstances, especially the agility of lower levels of 
government. 
The important, perhaps even decisive stage of the process is entered after international 
commitments have been established. The problems encountered in implementing the Bonn 
Convention indicate that the institutionalized inclusion of higher levels of government 
(mainly in terms of the need for ratification of follow-up agreements) may be counter- 
productive (at least under conditions in Western Europe; we will come back to this point). 
Moreover, if governments as such have become active, they have usually done so largely in 
order to placate public outrage after some spectacular incident such as the Endosulfan acci- 
dent in the late 1960s or, more recently, the Sandoz incident of 1986 - the latter led to three 
Rhine ministers conferences within one year. 
One of the key results of our analysis is that environmental authorities in the riparian 
countries have probably been the most important catalysts as regards the domestic impact of 
transboundary cooperation. For these actors, international agreements have not constituted 
obligations to be shunned wherever possible, but on the contrary an opportunity to strengthen 
their own role in various ways. They have managed to enhance their domestic position by 
increasing their knowledge base through information exchanges in the ICPR, and by using 
international commitments as an instrument to enhance their domestic bargaining position. 
However, the importance of transboundary cooperation in this respect should not be 
overestimated. Sufficiently independent and resourceful administrative structures at the 
domestic level, which are capable to use international cooperation to their own advantage, 
must probably exist in the first place. International cooperation may enhance their position, 
but cannot create them. The most important variable determining their strength is probably 
the degree of environmental consciousness among the domestic population. In the end it is 
this consciousness which creates the political pressure that forces governments to react by 
enacting environmental laws and establishing the bureaucratic structures to implement and 
enforce them. 
Non-governmental Actors 
In this section, we discuss the role of two types of non-governmental actors that have 
had a particularly important influence on efforts to curb Rhine pollution: industry and 
waterworks. One of the more striking results of our research is that many of the larger sources 
of Rhine pollution, and particularly the big chemical companies such as Sandoz and Roche in 
Basel, or Hoechst, Bayer and BASF in Germany are no longer passive and reluctant targets of 
environmental regulations. To the contrary, it appears that they have increasingly cut back on 
their immissions in anticipation of future regulation and have sought to influence regulatory 
processes well before any legislation has been passed. 
A telling sign of this development is the fact that in 1992 the German chemical firm 
Bayer received the so-called WRK-Rhine-Prize by the IAWR for its exemplary efforts in the 
field of waste-water treatment (IAWR 1995: 99). This distinction had hitherto been awarded 
to scientists or civil servants engaged in environmental protection. This development 
probably implies that the difficulty of implementing regulations on Rhine pollution has, at 
least for the larger point sources, eased considerably: the atmosphere among the key actors 
relevant to Rhine pollution seems to be one of reluctant cooperation rather than one of insu- 
perable antagonism. 
This (modestly) cooperative attitude of important parts of industry along the Rhine 
seems to contradict the traditional picture of the company as a single-minded profit 
maximizer: measures to prevent pollution from reaching the environment are usually costly, 
so one would expect them to be taken at the last possible moment, just before the cost of 
sanctions surmounts the cost of installing, say, a pollution treatment facility. The 
inconsistency of observed behavior of industry with this model can be explained as follows. 
First, the big companies do not operate in a societal vacuum: with the possible 
exception of France, the population of all Rhine riparian countries has since the beginning of 
the 1970s grown increasingly conscious of environmental matters. This development has 
created a public opinion climate in which being ostracised as a polluter can impose very 
heavy costs on industry, as the chemical firm Sandoz had to learn after the fire in 
Schweizerhalle in 1986. The reverse side is that a green image can be an important asset for 
public relations. Considerable investments of chemical and other companies in the projection 
of a green image through advertisements and other public relations instruments testifies to 
this point. 
These developments are also reflected in organizational changes within firms. 
Beginning in the 1960s the latter began to establish non-production related departments for 
pollution abatement in order to cope with increasing environmental regulatory activity at all 
political levels. These departments have grown in importance over time and have often been 
staffed by environmental scientists who have the same educational background as their 
"opponents" in state or international bureaucracies. The fact that these people have been part 
of the same scientific community and have thus often shared a common outlook and values 
on Rhine pollution issues has probably facilitated cooperation. 
The waterworks along the Rhine, the second type of non-governmental actors to be 
discussed here, have been organized in the International Association of Waterworks in the 
Rhine Basin (IAWR). IAWR, whose secretariat is located in Amsterdam, is an umbrella 
association whose members are associations of waterworks in the Netherlands (RIWA), 
Germany (AWR, AWBR), Switzerland, and France. It represents 113 waterworks in the 
Rhine catchment area. The waterworks can be regarded as a particular type of industry, one 
that operates under quite special conditions which, in turn, create unique incentives. These 
waterworks have been under pressure from strict legislation defining thresholds for polluting 
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substances in their output. This legislation has been increasingly enacted at the EU level. In 
addition, the waterworks have also been under pressure by their customers, and private 
households in particular, which are very sensitive to the quality of drinking water: we were 
told that a request for a glass of plain water in a Cologne Restaurant meets with incredulous 
stupefaction. 
Because the room of manoeuvre for the improvement of technology for drinking-water 
production is, for technical and cost reasons, rather small and the directors of waterworks are 
personally responsible for the quality of their output, the waterworks have a very strong 
incentive to improve the quality of their water input. At least in certain locations where their 
water input stems directly from the Rhine or wells in the immediate vicinity, notably in 
Germany and the Netherlands, the waterworks are strongly affected by the extent of Rhine 
pollution, and therefore by immissions upstream. Not surprisingly, therefore, the waterworks 
have organised themselves internationally early in the 1970s (IAWR 1995: 97) and engaged 
in lobbying efforts at various political levels. They also sought to identify the sources of parti- 
cularly harmful substances and put pressure on them to stop their immissions. They have 
done so through direct negotiations with the firms concerned. For the reasons mentioned 
above, many of these negotiations have been successful, even if they were not highly 
publicised. 
The Municipality of Rotterdam 
The Municipality of Rotterdam is, as we outlined above, in a very similar situation as 
the waterworks as far as its interests are concerned. It differs, however, in the approach it has 
26 See, for example, the EC drinking water directive of 1980. 
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used to put pressure on the polluters. Instead of the rather low-key approach of the IAWR it 
has led a highly publicized campaign in a style somewhat resembling that of some 
environmental NGOs, such as Greenpeace. In addition it has relied quite heavily on legal 
means of threat and coercion. Whether this approach has been more effective than the 
approach used by IAWR for example, is difficult to pin down. 
The differences in the approach between Rotterdam and IAWR can probably be 
explained by the fact that the Rotterdam municipality, as a political body responsible to its 
own population/voters, experienced a greater need than IAWR to engage in more tangible 
efforts to demonstrate to its constituency that it was active in trying to avert the costly 
building of another slufter. One should also consider that, at the time the Rotterdam project 
was initiated, it was by no means clear what we know now, that considerable pollution 
reductions were lying ahead. 
The European Union 
The influence of the European Union as an actor involved in the clean-up of the Rhine 
is difficult to gauge. Moreover, its role seems to have changed during the period in question. 
In the 1970s, EU environmental policy was hampered by substantial differences among 
member states about the approach to be used: the immission approach was favoured by 
Britain, for example; the emission approach was favored by Germany and the other Rhine 
riparians (GrijnsIMostert 1992: 28). Member states also held different positions as to the 
standards to be applied. There are indications that the introduction of the EU as an additional 
contracting party to the ICPR and the chemical pollution convention slowed down the imple- 
mentation process. The principal reason was that some countries (mainly Germany) made the 
conclusion of follow-up treaties to the emission oriented chemical convention conditional on 
the adoption of equivalent directives within the wider framework of the EU. But steps in this 
direction were blocked by Great Britain until 1983. 
The fact that the 1976 EC-directive on "Pollution caused by Certain Dangerous 
Substances Discharged into the Aquatic Environment" (761464EEC) was mirrored by the 
Bonn convention on chemical pollution therefore seems to have been rather unhelpful. The 
drinking water directive (801778EEC) of 1980, the other major piece of relevant EC 
legislation, has no counterpiece within the cooperative framework of the Rhine riparians. Its 
impact is therefore, at least theoretically, easier to assess. It is generally acknowledged that 
the threshold values set by this directive are very strict (even water treatment plants in highly 
developed countries such as Germany were at first unable to fulfil them). This led to 
implementation difficulties. 
Unlike regulations, directives address not individuals but member states. As a result, 
they need to be transformed into national regulations by the member states to become binding 
upon individuals and corporate actors. It seems that member states implemented them with 
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varying degrees of success. Because the drinking water directive regulates water quality at 
the very end of the pipe, its influence on polluter behavior and pollution of the Rhine is 
necessarily indirect. The existence of this directive has, however, served as an argument for 
the waterworks (which are directly concerned) in their lobbying activities vis-h-vis polluters 
and governments. 
This rather ambiguous picture notwithstanding, the fact that a growing number of 
relevant international interest groups (for example, chemical and pesticide industry 
associations) and even national interest groups (e.g. the German association of waterworks) 
17 The unsatisfactory implementation of EC environmental legislation seems to be a widespread 
problem, at least if one uses the large number of legal cases against member states as an indicator (Oppermann 
199 1 :750; Vogel 1993: 190; Grijnsb4ostert 1992:29). 
are present in Brussels seems to indicate that Brussels has become increasingly important as a 
focus of environmental regulatory activity in the Rhine basin. 
5. Background Variables 
The analysis of causal pathways and the actors involved in curbing pollution of the 
Rhine provides us with a relatively comprehensive picture as to the role transboundary efforts 
have played in bringing about reductions in heavy metal pollution. To complete the analysis, 
and to be able to draw some more general conclusions that may be applicable to other cases, 
such as the Black-Triangle, we have to come back to some background variables that were so 
far referred to only in passing. In line with a distinction used by many social science 
28 theories , we distinguish between ideas, an indicator of which is environmental 
consciousness, and structures, for which we will discuss several variables 
Environmental Awareness 
The rising degree of environmental awareness in the population of all Rhine riparian 
states during the 1970s and 80s, which is indicated by the growth of green NGOs and political 
parties, was probably the most important driving force behind the spectacular cleanup of the 
Rhine in general, and the international component we are interested in here in particular. It 
would go beyond the scope of this paper to explain this development and its precise effects on 
efforts to curb pollution of the Rhine. However, this section touches on a few aspects in 
which rising environmental awareness among constituencies may have spurred pollution 
reductions. 
First, growing environmental awareness forced (vote maximizing, we assume) 
governments to do something about Rhine pollution; to enact national laws for the protection 
of the environment. These separate but parallel national efforts to clean the rivers in the Rhine 
catchment area are certainly the main contributor to pollution reduction in the Rhine as a 
whole. 
Second, to cope with the implementation of this legislation, national environmental 
authorities had to be created or strengthened. For the reasons discussed above, the existence 
of entrenched and resourceful environmental agencies is probably an important precondition 
for making international cooperation fruitful and effective - as well as facilitating the 
implementation of national law. While international cooperation, as we have argued above, 
may have strengthened these agencies' back, they already needed to have a strong back in the 
first place. 
Third, public outrage or concern, especially about spectacular incidents of a boundary 
transcending character such as the Sandoz spill is conditional on pre-existing environmental 
awareness. Such incidents have thus been important triggers for international agreements and 
declarations by governments. These declarations and agreements have then served as starting 
points for the processes analyzed above. 
Fourth, environmental awareness among populations has changed the conditions under 
which polluting firms operate (see above). Polluter behavior tends to be strongly penalized by 
the public at large, while the projection of a green image is an important asset. Especially the 
big chemical firms are under close scrutiny by environmental NGO's and the press; larger- 
scale discharges (be it on a regular basis or due to an accident) rarely go unmonitored and 
uncommented. 
28 See, for example, Gill, StephenLaw, David (1988), The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, 
Problems and Policies, London: Harvester, Wheatsheaf. 
Similarity of Structural Conditions 
The second group of background variables, which needs to be controlled, pertains to 
structural conditions. All Rhine riparian countries are Western European democracies at a 
high level of socio-economic development. The industries causing chemical pollution are 
more or less evenly distributed among these countries, and their environmental standards at 
the outset of transboundary pollution reduction efforts were about the same. This 
circumstance has facilitated cooperation and made the latter - perhaps paradoxically - less 
urgent, because neither the costs nor the benefits of pollution abatement measures would 
accumulate asymmetrically across the riparian countries. There is, in other words, no clear-cut 
distinction between those who suffer from pollution and those who cause it: all riparian 
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countries are to a certain extent both victims and polluters. 
If, for instance, Germany takes measures to improve the water quality of the Rhine or 
its catchment area (covering a substantial part of the country), this is seen by its 
environmentally conscious population as being to its own advantage, as well as having the 
side-effect of benefiting the Netherlands downstream. While no water is taken directly from 
the Rhine for drinking water purposes in Germany water from adjacent wells is used, whose 
3'0 quality depends critically on Rhine water quality. The same is true for Switzerland, where 
many of the lakes in the Rhine catchment area are used for drinking water production. 
An additional problem, which prevents states from turning an international river into a 
gutter with the goal of minimizing the country's costs of pollution reductions is the following: 
a country would have to treat dischargers on its territory differently. Those at or near the point 
where the river crosses the border (e.g. Base1 in Switzerland) would be allowed to discharge 
without limit while those in more sensitive regions inland would have to pay for treatment 
facilities. In a state where information flows freely, and where the principle of equality before 
the law is generally accepted, such a solution would meet strong opposition from those who 
are by their geographical location under the obligation to reduce their emissions and to bear 
the costs. 
Another structural condition which facilitated the cleanup of the Rhine were the high 
growth rates prevalent particularly in the chemical industry along the Rhine during the 1970 
and 80s. High profits certainly made the installation of often costly waste water treatment 
facilities and other pollution reduction measures easier. 
Taken together, these background variables created a favorable environment for 
cleaning up the Rhine: one could imagine this clean-up happening even without 
transboundary cooperation, although it would probably have happened somewhat slower 
given the effects that transboundary cooperation had on pollution reduction efforts (see 
section 5) .  
6. Conclusion 
Pollution of the river Rhine by heavy metals has declined substantially since the 1970s. 
At the same time, we can observe an extensive web of transboundary political and legal 
activity designed to reduce such pollution. In this paper we have made an attempt at analyzing 
whether, and if so how these two developments are causally related. In other words, did the 
observed transboundary efforts contribute to curbing pollution of the Rhine, and if so to what 
extent and how? 
29 The example of the chloride pollution by the mines de potasse dlAlsace shows that this may indeed be 
an important factor; in that case the costs of reducing pollution accumulated mainly in France, while the 
Netherlands benefited from it. The tortuous history of the international efforts to solve this particular problem 
indicates that similarity in this respect matters (Bernauer 1995a). 
30 See Bundesministerium fiir Umwelt Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit 1995: 7. 
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The analysis in this paper does not produce a simple answer. Causal chains leading 
from transboundary efforts to the behavior of polluters and ultimately to river pollution itself 
are long and multifaceted. As a result, statistical analysis, often used for the analysis of 
impacts of domestic policy measures, is of little use. The transboundary efforts whose impact 
we examined qualitatively include international negotiations and agreements aimed 
exclusively at reducing pollution of the Rhine, negotiations and agreements between non-state 
or para-state actors, and legislative activity by the European CommunityIUnion. 
Our analysis shows that transboundary efforts have influenced polluter behavior in 
four different ways. First, these efforts have intensified the exchange of information at various 
levels (inter-governmental, transnational, ECIEU). This exchange ultimately created a tightly 
knit community of people with a consensual knowledge on the causes of pollution and 
methods to deal with the problem. Second, transboundary efforts were used by domestic 
environmental agencies to strengthen their position with regard to other government agencies 
and the polluting actors. Third, the extensive transboundary political and legal activity with 
regard to Rhine pollution led polluters to reduce their emissions in anticipation of future 
regulation (domestic and transboundary). Fourth, the legally binding output of transboundary 
efforts contributed to changing the behavior of polluters. Our analysis suggests that the first 
and second type of effect were probably more pronounced than the other two. 
In drawing any general conclusions from this analysis, we have to keep in mind two 
groups of background conditions: first, environmental awareness in all riparian countries of 
the Rhine has been relatively high, at least since the 1980s; second, all Rhine riparian 
countries are at a high level of socio-economic development. We think, however, that the 
following lessons might well be useful to efforts to clean up other international rivers: 
One should not expect that the traditional approach to international environmental 
politics - international treaties and protocols, translation of these agreements into 
domestic law, implementation of these laws - will necessarily work better than 
"softer" approaches, such as action programs or transnational policy efforts. This 
applies in particular to relatively homogeneous and environmentally advanced 
countries in which a stable legal and administrative framework already exists. 
Liability rules may contribute towards pollution reductions, but they are no 
panacea. Because of difficulties involved in identifying sources of pollution, 
estimating damages, and attributing particular portions of the damage to 
individual polluters are enormous, the effect of threats of legal action on polluters 
often tends to be small. A different case may be pollution originating from 
accidents (such as the Sandoz accident), where the source of pollution is easily 
identified, and damages are usually quite straightforward. Furthermore, public 
pressure on the firm to reach a face-saving settlement is usually higher in these 
cases. 
International and transnational negotiations can contribute to learning processes in 
which decision-makers develop common perceptions and approaches to dealing 
with river pollution problems. 
International or transnational commitments can strengthen domestic government 
agencies favorably disposed towards pollution reductions. They cannot create 
such agencies, but can enhance their position vis-h-vis government agencies or 
sources of pollution less favorably disposed towards cleaning up the river. 
A further lesson to be learned from the Rhine case is that background conditions 
which are largely outside of the scope of international cooperation are highly 
important, and even crucial as they shape the contents and the forms of 
international cooperation and its effectiveness much more than the reverse. 
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ANNEX: 
Source: Stigliani et al. 1993, 790. 
I Il(iUiit3 
/ Comparison of aqueous emissions of cadmium, lead, and zinc by point and diHuse 
/ sources to the Rhine River during peak years with emissions in 1988 
Late 60si 1988 
early 70s 
Diffuse sources 
Household sewage 
1 Small industries 
Phosphate fert. pr. 
a Cadm~um product. m. 
Iron and steel + coke 
0 Metal reflnlng 
Late 60s' 1988 
early 70s 
0 Diffuse sources 
U Household sewage 
Small ~ndustr~es 
a Other large tnd 
n Chemical industry 
Iron and steel + coke 
a Metal refining 
Lale 60s 1988 
early 70s 
0 D~nttse sources 
a Household sewage 
Stnall induslrles 
0 Galvantzing (I. s~ze) 
[Z1 Chern~cal Industry 
Iron arid steel + coke 
a Metal refining 
FIGURE 2 
